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We analyze the following question associated with flexible outsourcing under imperfect 
domestic labour market: How does the implementation of profit sharing influence flexible 
outsourcing? We show that in general profit sharing has a negative effect on low skilled wage 
and thus an outsourcing decreasing character. However due to labour union determination of 
effort a constant effort level will result so that in this case firm’s optimal choice of profit 
sharing is zero. 
JEL Code: E24, J23, J33, J51, J82. 







Department of Economics 
University of Helsinki 





School of Business & Economics 









The authors thank Academy of Finland (grant No. 1117698) for financial support. Koskela 
thanks Freie Universität Berlin for great hospitality and König thanks University of Helsinki 
for great hospitality.   2
1.       Introduction  
 
In an integrated world, marginal cost differences are the driving force for the 
reallocation of production parts (offshoring) and for the make-or-buy-decision 
(outsourcing). Especially for western European countries, the wage and labour cost 
differences constitute the central explanation for the increasing business practice of 
offshoring and international outsourcing to eastern European or Asian countries.
1 
Reasons for the wage gaps are, among others, differences in labour market institutions 
and in the process of wage determination. In most western European countries, wages 
are determined by bilateral bargaining between firms or employer federations and 
trade unions. In eastern European or Asian countries, however, unions are much 
weaker so that wages are determined by market forces (see e.g. Du Caju et al. (2008)). 
Concerning the analysis of the effect of outsourcing on compensation schemes 
under wage bargaining there are two focuses in the literature, the case of committed 
outsourcing and flexible outsourcing. While in the committed case outsourcing takes 
place before wage bargaining
2, in the flexible case outsourcing is decided after wage 
bargaining. Our focus in this paper is to assume that outsourcing is flexible, i.e. 
determined simultaneously with domestic labour demand and after wage formation.
3 
Skaksen (2004) has analyzed the implications of outsourcing for wage setting and 
employment under imperfectly competitive labour markets in terms of both potential 
(non-realized) and realized international outsourcing.  By assuming that output is 
produced by combining two intermediate activities, where one activity can be 
perfectly substituted by outsourcing, he shows that the wage level depends on 
                                                 
1   See Amiti and Wei (2005) and Rishi and Saxena (2004), which emphasize the big difference in 
labour costs as the main explanation for the strong increase in outsourcing of both 
manufacturing and services to countries with low labour cost. 
2   See e.g. Perry (1997) for an overview about the relationship between outsourcing and wage 
bargaining. Also e.g. Danthine and Hunt (1994), Zhao (2001) and Koskela and Stenbacka (2009) 
have analyzed committed outsourcing issue.  
3    There are also some new analyses, which incorporated flexible outsourcing and wage 
bargaining, e.g. Koskela and Poutvaara (2008) or Koskela (2008). But the main focuses in these 
papers are labour taxation issues in the absence of profit sharing.   3
outsourcing cost. If these costs are under a lower bound, the union will desist from 
wage dumping to avoid outsourcing. Are the cost over a critical value, there is no 
outsourcing and the union can set relative high wage level. For intermediate cost 
level, external procurement can prevent by setting domestic wage level equal to 
outsourcing cost. Also, Braun and Scheffel (2007) have developed a simple two-stage 
game between a monopoly union and a firm by assuming that the union sets wages 
before the firm decides on the degree of outsourcing and the level of production. They 
argued that under such flexible outsourcing the costs of outsourcing have an 
ambiguous effect on the wage set by the labour union. But in these papers they have 
abstracted from the analysis of profit sharing as a part of the compensation scheme 
and bargaining over effort, which is our focus.     
The threat of flexible outsourcing as a reaction to high domestic marginal 
production cost will dampen the opportunity of the trade union to realize a high wage 
level. To induce them to abstain from external procurement of intermediate goods, 
western European firms need lower marginal cost. But if lower costs are not possible, 
then firms have to increase productivity of domestic production, which is influenced 
by workers’ effort. One way to stimulate effort is profit sharing.
4 The idea behind the 
implementation of profit sharing is that this will induce incentives to increase effort 
and thus productivity for given wage level, while the climate in a firm will be 
improved.
5 However, profit sharing can also affect the wage formation, which could 
lead to a lower base wage since a part of the former wage level is substituted by profit 
income. Since only the base wage enters marginal cost, in this case outsourcing will 
decrease, ceteris paribus. The biggest problem of firm’s owner is to solve the moral 
hazard problem and to verify the individual effort. In the literature of efficiency wage 
                                                 
4                  Empirical studies show that profit sharing is an important phenomenon in many OECD 
countries. Pendleton et al. (2001) have presented detailed data on profit sharing schemes in 14 
OECD countries. See also Conyon and Freeman (2001). 
5   Introducing a profit sharing scheme can increase the motivation of a worker and thus effort, see 
Cable and Fitzroy (1980). On the other side Jones and Pliskin (1991) and Kruse (1993) find 
negative productivity effects of profit sharing.    4
models
6, this is solved with paying a higher wage than the competitive level, but 
effort can also be interpreted as working condition such as speed of production line 
and so be a part of wage negotiations. In that case, the literature is mainly focusing on 
comparison of effort level set by union and in a competitive market, analysis of the 
effect of bargaining power on effort level and efficiency properties.
7 Also the 
implementation of profit sharing schemes is analyzed with collective bargaining. 
Pohjola (1987) and Anderson and Devereux (1989) show that efficient but 
unenforceable bargaining outcome, because direct negotiation on the total 
employment is precluded, can be made enforceable by introducing bargaining over 
wages and profit share. Additional Anderson and Devereux (1989) show that for 
efficient bargaining over wages and employment implementing profit sharing has no 
effect on wages, employment and profit both when profit sharing is exogenously 
increased by legislator and when profit sharing is a part of the optimal contract. 
In this paper we use the approach of union setting wage and effort, while the 
firm set the profit share to analyze: How does profit sharing influence flexible 
outsourcing? By knowing this we can also show due to comparative statics, how does 
outsourcing influence the wage level? The analysis shows that the union sets an effort 
level, which is unaffected by wage and profit sharing. However profit sharing can 
decrease the wage and thus outsourcing. For the optimal profit share we find an 
earlier result, that the firm won’t implement any profit sharing scheme. For our minor 
question we find, that in the presence of outsourcing due to a more elastic labour 
demand the base wage is lower than in the absence of outsourcing. 
                                                 
6   See Salop (1979) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) as the standard models. For a survey, see 
Akerlof and Yellen (1986), where they mentioned (i) shirking models, (ii) labour turnover 
models, (iii) adverse selection models and (iv) sociological models in their book, which includes 
the main initial papers associated with these original important efficiency wage models.  
7   Bulkley (1992) has shown that a monopoly union will reduce the specified effort level below 
that which would be demanded by the firm in its absence. Moreover, Bulkley and Myles (1996) 
showed that the popular wisdom that unions reduce effort is generally false. The effect of 
bargaining power if effort is negotiable have been also analyzed by Sampson (1993) and Bulkley 
and Myles (1997). They showed that in a generalized Nash bargaining between a union and a 
firm over employment and effort higher bargaining power of the firm can increase the effort 
level.   5
We proceed as follows. The basic structure of the theoretical framework is 
briefly presented in section 2. In section 3 we derivate the optimal labour and 
outsourcing demand. Section 4 investigates the effort and wage formation by the 
monopoly trade union. Finally, we sum our conclusions in section 5.       
 
2.      The Basic Framework 
 
We assume that output depends not only on domestic labour and international 
outsourcing, but also on the average effort by workers, i.e. the workers’ productivity. 
This lies in conformity with the efficiency wage hypothesis form.
8 The timing 
captures the idea that the representative firm is flexible to decide about the amount of 
outsourcing simultaneously with domestic labour demand, but commits to profit 
sharing before wage and effort determination. After the firm has decided about profit 
sharing, the monopoly trade union sets the wage and effort with respect to the profit 
share level. Knowing the base wage, the representative firm determines outsourcing 
and employment. The timing of events is depicted as Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1:  Time sequence  
 
   Stage 1        Stage 2           Stage 3              
 
profit            wage and effort      outsourcing M ,  
   sharing τ                  formation w,                 labour demand L 
 




                                                 
8         See e.g. the book edited by Akerlof and Yellen (1986).   6
3.  Optimal Outsourcing and Labour Demand 
 
In this section we characterize the optimal labour demand and outsourcing by 
the representative firm by taking profit sharing, wage and effort as given. The revenue 
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where the price of the output is normalized to unity, L is the amount of domestic 
labour,  e characterize the average effort level, and M  is the firm’s labour input 
acquired from external suppliers through outsourcing.
9 The parameter  1 > δ  means 
that the production function is an increasing and concave function of inputs.
10 Here 
we assume that there is a perfect substitutability between domestic labour and 
outsourcing.  
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by taking the negotiated effort, e, wage, w,  and profit sharing, τ , as given. We 
assume that the costs of outsourcing are convex to represent the establishing capacity 
                                                 
9   We following the efficiency wage literature and assume that effort is labour augmenting. In what 
follows, eL  can be interpreted as effective labour. 
10      This paper does not focus on the simultaneous presence of imperfections in labor and product 
markets so that in this model the wage-moderating effect of outsourcing is independent of 
potential market structure change in the product market. Lommerud et al. (2006) have 
demonstrated how international mergers might curb the market power of unions giving socially 
excessive incentive for international mergers, unless products are close substitutes. A somewhat 
related wage-moderating effect of foreign investments is developed in Eckel and Egger (2006). 
They focus on duopoly competition within a framework where the firms can produce either in 
one or both of two identical countries. Within such a framework foreign market penetration 
induces a wage-moderating effect in a unionized economy, because it improves the firm’s 
outside option relevant for the wage negotiations.    7
for foreign outsourced activity so that the marginal cost of outsourcing increases in 
the scope of activities to outsource.  The first-order conditions 
() 0
1
= − + ⋅ =
− w M eL e L δ π  and  () 0
1
= − + =
− cM M eL M δ π  can be expressed as  
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Domestic labour demand is a negative function of wage and the amount of 
outsourcing and a positive function of both outsourcing cost and effort. Higher 
outsourcing will decrease domestic labour demand, which lies in conformity with 
empirics
11 and results of our assumption of substitutability. However, labour demand 
does not directly depend on profit sharing, which lies also in conformity with 
empirical evidence.
12 For outsourcing we found that the external procurement is a 
positive function of domestic wage rate and a negative function of both outsourcing 
cost and effort. In the case of revenue function (1)  the direct reactions could be 
described by the outsourcing elasticities in terms of outsourcing cost, effort and wage 
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The direct wage elasticity of labour demand, which turns out to be important 
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11   See e.g. Görg and Hanley (2005).  
12        See e.g. Wadwani and Wall (1990) and Cahuc and Dormont (1997).   8
The wage elasticity depends on parameter δ  and also on wage rate and outsourcing 
cost via M and  L which we present in section 4. In the absence of outsourcing the 
wage elasticity is constant and smaller, i.e.  η δ η η < = =
=0 M . 
 
4.     Wage and Effort Formation by Monopoly Labour Union  
 
Since the individual worker has no impact on profit, the dominant strategy is 
to provide only a minimum level of effort, i.e. shirking. As we mention in the 
introduction, effort could be understand as working condition, which can be 
determined in bargaining rounds between trade union and firms. In this analysis we 
assume a simultaneous setting of wage and effort by the employee federation.  
 
4.1.      Wage and Effort Determination    
 
The individual utility function for the employed worker is (5a) and for the 




w v − + = π
τ
,                                                     (5a) 
b v = ,                                                                          (5b) 
 
so that utility is assumed to be linear in income. In addition we assume that provision 
of the effort is associated with a disutility for the worker, which is assumed to satisfy 
the following convex function  ( )
γ γ
/ 1 e e g =  with  1 0 < <γ , i.e.  ( )( ) 0 ' ' , ' > e g e g . 
The monopoly labour union is assumed to interested in income of union 
member, so that the objective function is  ( )v L N vL V − + = . So we can rewrite the 
union utility as 
    9
                     () ( ) bN L e g L b w V Max
e w
+ − + − = π τ 3 2 1
) , (
s.t.  0 = = M L π π                         (6) 
 
where b  captures the exogenous minimum income for labour union members N .  
Maximizing in terms of the base wage and effort subject to labour demand and 
outsourcing gives  
 
( ) ( ) 0 = − + − + = w w w w L e g b w L L V π τ ,                       (7) 
 
which can be solved as  [] ( ) g b w + = − − η τ η ) 1 ( , so that we have  
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This is an implicit form concerning wage formation, because both the nominator and 
denominator of the mark-up depend in a non-linear way on the wage rate according to 
equation (4).  
The first order condition for the optimal effort level is  
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A simultaneous solution of (8) and (10) gives the optimal effort 












e .                                                               (11) 
 
Our analysis shows that optimal effort level decided by the monopoly trade union is 
independent of profit share or base wage.  
Thus we can conclude that profit sharing does not affect effort provision and 
so it does not increase productivity. However, we also mention that implementing 
profit sharing can have a wage moderation effect. Since higher wages increase 
external procurements, we have to show the impact of profit sharing on base wage to 
answer our research question and show the impact of profit sharing on outsourcing.  
From equation (8) and (11) follows that profit sharing has only a direct effect, 
which can be seen in the denominator. This effect we call substitution effect, since 
this effect will decrease the base wage, which means that a former part of the base 
wage is substituted by profit income. The same holds in the case of no outsourcing. 






− + − +
− =














+ = 2 1
eL
eML eLM w w
w δ η  which gives  ()() 0 1 1 > + + = η δ η
weL
M
w . Although, 
we find that profit sharing has a complementary character for the base wage, in the 
empirical literature there is also evidence for a supplementary property of profit 
sharing.
13 In the absence of outsourcing, we have  0
0 =
= M w η ,  so that base wage does 
                                                 
13   Black and Lynch (2000) show by using U.S. data, that profit sharing results in lower regular pay 
for workers, which implies a compensatory character, but in Wadhwani and Wall (1990) by 
using UK data and also in Kraft and Ugarkovic (2005) by using German panel data, it has been 
shown that introducing profit sharing does not reduce the wage, which implies a supplementary 
character.   11
not affect the wage elasticity of labour demand. In that case we get qualitatively the 















In a similar way we can also look at the wage reaction concerning changes in 
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Higher outsourcing cost will decrease the wage elasticity of labor demand and will 
reduce ceteris paribus the demand of outsourcing, which leads to a decrease of the 
ratio of outsourcing and effective labour, which makes the labour demand more 
inelastic.
14 Thus the wage effect of changing outsourcing cost is 
        
                                   ( )
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0
/ ) 1 ( 1
/ 1
>
− + + −
−
− =







c ,                                     (13) 
 
so that lower outsourcing cost in the presence of flexible outsourcing will lower the 
wage. This holds, since lower outsourcing cost means for given wage level higher 
outsourcing demand, so that the labour demand elasticity becomes more elastic and 
therefore the wage has to fall, since the trade union can avoid higher outsourcing with 
lower in-house cost and make integrated production more attractive.
15  
We can summarize our findings in 
     
Proposition 1: In the presence of flexible outsourcing, 
a)  union bargaining over effort is unaffected by base wage and profit 
sharing, and 
b)   profit sharing is compensating part of income, and 
c)   lower outsourcing cost will lower the wage.   
                                                 
14        See e.g. Hasan et al. (2007), Slaughter (2001) and Senses (2006). 
15    This lies in conformity with empirics according to which there is substitutability between 
outsourcing and domestic labour (see e.g. Munch and Skaksen (2009)).   12
 
Now, we analyze the effect of implementing profit sharing in a firm which engages in 
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so that the effect of implementing profit sharing is negative. In the case of a 
complementary character of profit sharing, implementing profit sharing will reduce 
the demand for outsourcing. This relationship is intuitive for the following reason. 
Higher profit sharing will decrease the base wage. Since only the base wage enters the 
marginal cost, the advantage of integrated production increases by inducing a higher 
labour demand. In this case, the amount of outsourcing will be lower with higher 
profit sharing. Since effort level is constant, only this wage reduction channel induces 
lower outsourcing by substituting wage income by profit income so that we have 
 
Proposition 2: In general profit sharing decreases marginal cost, so 
that outsourcing activities are decreasing. 
 
4.2.      Committed Profit Sharing  
 
The representative firm commits to profit sharing  to maximize profit subject 
to labour demand (3a), outsourcing (3b), effort determination (11) and wage 
formation (8) so that  
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The first-order condition is  ( ) 0 1 = − + − τ π τ π , where π is the indirect profit. The 
first derivative with respect to profit sharing is  L wτ τ π − = . Using the known terms, 
the first-order condition yields the optimal committed profit sharing in the presence 
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. This implies 
0
0 =
= M τ . In the presence of outsourcing the optimal profit share expression is more 
complicated, but it can be shown that  0
0 <
> M τ , so that the firm also desist from 
profit sharing.  
We can summarize our findings in 
     
Proposition 3: If the trade union sets effort level, the firm desists from 
profit sharing.   
 
This is reasonable since the worker will only provide the effort level setting by the 
union, which is independent of remunerations. The provision of this level is the 
dominate strategy for an individual worker, because he/she has no influence on the   14
firm’s profit. Since the decision about effort provision is unchanged, even if the firm 
will set some incentives by introducing profit sharing, the firm will only contribute a 
part of profit to the worker without effects on effort or profit. Thus, it is beneficial for 
the firm to avoid profit sharing. The same argumentation holds if the firm doesn’t 
engage in outsourcing. Although profit sharing can decrease the wage, a firm will 
abandon from this instrument, since due to outsourcing there is also a wage 
moderation effect.  Since the firm doesn’t care about using domestic labour or 
outsourcing, there is no incentive to implement profit sharing for reducing the wage 
and lower amount of profit the firm owner gets. 
So we can answer our question as follows: If the union set the effort level, 
profit sharing in general will decrease outsourcing demand. However a profit 
maximizing firm will abstain from profit sharing, since it creates no enhancing 
productivity effect. Thus there is also no wage moderation, so that profit sharing has 
no influence on outsourcing demand.  
Knowing the optimal effort level, we can due to comparative statics give a 
statement about the wage effect of outsourcing. Since in the absence and presence of 





A  with  ()
eL
M
1 + + = δ δ η  and  η δ η < =
=0 M . Since the mark-up is decreasing 
with higher labour demand elasticity it follows that 
0 = <
M w w . This we can sum to  
 
Proposition 4: Outsourcing has a wage decreasing effect. 
 
This holds, since higher outsourcing demand results from lower outsourcing cost. As 
we have shown in (13) this reduce the base wage due to a more elastic labour demand. 
So setting a high wage increases the loss for the union leads and leads to a less 
aggressive union behavior what results in a lower wage. Hereby the union can avoid 
outsourcing and make integrated production more attractive.   15
5.       Conclusions 
 
We have focused on the question: How does profit sharing influence flexible 
outsourcing? In our framework we show, that the union setting effort level is 
independent of profit sharing. So only a wage moderation effect can occur if 
implementing a profit sharing scheme. Since outsourcing and domestic labour are 
substitutes this wage effect leads to lower outsourcing. So, in general implementing 
profit sharing can lead to lower outsourcing due to the wage effect. However, the 
optimal profit share is zero, since implementing profit sharing does not increase 
effort. Moreover, we also showed that lower outsourcing cost and thus higher 
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